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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
VS. 
ALVIN DALE RICHENS, 
AppelIant/Defendant. 
CASE NO. 88-0007-CA 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A., 
section 78-2a-3(2)(f). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the trial court's acceptance of 
Defendant's guilty plea and the trial court's denial of the 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea heard before the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson sitting in Summit County, Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in accepting defendant's original 
December 5, 1986 guilty pleas by not following the guidelines 
subsequently espoused by the Utah Supreme Court in STATE V. GIBBONS. 
2. Did the trial court err by denying defendant's motion to 
withdraw guilty plea. 
3. Was the defendant denied effective assistance of counsel 
during the plea bargaining stage and plea stage of the proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged, in several informations with: 
Summit County Case No- 1109: 
Count I, Burglary (2nd Degree Felony) 
Count II, Theft (3rd Degree Felony) 
Count III, Receiving Stolen Property (3rd Degree Felony) 
Summit County Case No. 1110: 
Count I, Burglary (2nd Degree Felony) 
Count II, Theft (3rd Degree Felony) 
Count III, Receiving Stolen Property (3rd Degree Felony) 
Summit County Case No. 1113: 
Count I, Burglary (3rd Degree Felony) 
Summit County Case No. 1114: 
Count I, Burglary (2nd Degree Felony) 
Defendant was bound over to District Court on all the Counts in 
the various Informations. 
On December 5, 1986, before 3rd District Court Judge Judith M. 
Billings (R. 136, pg. 1-8), sitting in Summit County, Utah, 
Defendant, represented by attorney Martin V. Gravis, entered into a 
Plea Bargain with the State, signed an "Affidavit of Defendant," 
(R. 11-16) and plead guilty to: 
Summit County Case No. 1109: 
Count II, Theft (3rd Degree Felony) 
Summit County Case No. 1110: 
Count II, Theft (3rd Degree Felony) 
Summit County Case No. 1113: 
Count I, Burglary (3rd Degree Felony) 
Summit County Case No. 1114: 
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Count I, Burglary (3rd Degree Felony), a lesser included 
offense included in the information-
Pursuant to a December 12, 1986 Judgment and Commitment 
(R. 18-19), Defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an 
indeterminate sentence of zero to five years on each of the Theft 
charges and zero to five years on each of the Burglary charges, each 
of the sentences to run concurrently, but consecutively to the 
sentence Defendant was serving at the time for another charge 
unrelated to the Summit County cases. 
On or about July 28, 1987 and August 10, 1987 Defendant, pro se, 
filed Motions to Withdraw Guilty Plea (R. 28-31), as well as several 
other motions, requesting that the Court allow him to withdraw his 
December 5, 1986 guilty pleas. 
Legal Counsel, Elliott Levine, was appointed to represent the 
Defendant, transcripts were ordered, and a hearing was held on 
October 13, 1987 before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson sitting in 
Summit County, Utah. After hearing Defendant's arguments, however, 
the Court denied the Defendant's Motions to Withdraw his Guilty 
Pleas. (R. 105 and 120-121) 
Defendant then filed this present appeal, pro se, appealing the 
trial court's denial of his Motions to Withdraw Guilty Pleas. 
In an effort to address some of the problems Defendant was 
facing with the Board of Pardons as a result of his Summit County 
Guilty Pleas and commitment, an Amended Commitment and Judgment was 
signed and entered by the Honorable Homer F„ Wilkinson on September 
16, 1988, which merely made it clear on the face of the Commitment 
and Judgment that the crimes to which the Defendant plead guilty to 
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were property crimes and not crimes against the person. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in accepting 
defendant's original December 5, 1986 guilty pleas by not following 
the guidelines subsequently espoused by the Utah Supreme Court in 
STATE V. GIBBONS and the requirements of Criminal Procedure Rule 
11(e). 
2. Appellant contends that the trial court erred, and abused 
its discretion, by denying defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea 
in light of the violations of the STATE V. GIBBONS guidelines and 
Criminal Procedure Rule 11(e) requirements. 
3. Appellant contends that he was denied effective assistance 
of counsel during the plea bargaining stage and plea stage of the 
proceedings. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
It is Appellant's contention that the trial Court erred 
originally in accepting Defendant's guilty plea on December 5, 1986. 
As the basis for this assertion Appellant relies on the Utah Supreme 
Court case of STATE v. GIBBONS. 740 P2d 1309 (Utah, 1987). In the 
GIBBONS case very specific guidelines were set down by our State 
Supreme Court governing acceptance of guilty pleas. The Supreme 
Court stated, at page 1312: "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial 
courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional requirements are 
complied with when a guilty plea is entered. The basis for that duty 
is found in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 
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1712-13, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)...." 
What Appellant argues in this appeal is that he did not 
understand the elements of the crimes to which he entered his guilty 
plea and, in fact, states that he plead guilty to crimes for which he 
was not guilty. 
Under the guidelines of the GIBBONS case Appellant's argument 
should be well taken on appeal. The transcript of the proceeding 
during which Appellant enter his pleas of guilty (R. 136, pg. 1-8) is 
void of any questioning by the trial court as to whether Appellant 
understood the elements of the crimes to which he was pleading 
guilty. Likewise, the record is void of any explanation to the 
Appellant of the elements of the crimes to which he was entering a 
guilty plea. Further, the record is void of any determination by the 
trial court as to whether there was a factual basis for the pleas. 
These deficiencies at the plea stage clearly violate the 
Appellants constitutional rights, as set forth in BQYKIN, as well as 
deviating from the requirements of Rule 11(e). Once again, our State 
Supreme Court, in GIBBONS, stated at page 1313: "Because a guilty 
plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, 
it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an 
understanding of the law in relation to the facts.... The judge 
(emphasis added) must determine 'that the conduct which the defendant 
admits constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or 
information or an offense included therein to which the defendant has 
pleaded guilty.'... There is no adequate substitute for demonstrating 
in the record at the time the plea is entered the defendant's 
understanding of the nature oi the charge against him." 
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In this present case the Appellant signed an "Affidavit of 
Defendant" (R. 11-16), the contents of which the trial court almost 
exclusively relied upon in accepting Appellant's guilty plea. (R. 
136, pg. 4, 1. 12 to pg. 5, 1. 22). Once again, under GIBBONS (at 
page 1313), the fact that Appellant signed this affidavit, indicated 
he had read its contents and understood its contents does not cure 
the deficiencies of the trial court as set forth herein. Even for 
argument's sake if Appellant admits the sufficiency of the affidavit, 
the trial court still did not carry out its burden imposed by U.C.A., 
section 77-35-11. (GIBBONS at pg. 1314) 
While it is apparent that the guidelines set down in the GIBBONS 
case were violated, the case of STATE v. VASILACQPULQS, 84 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 25 (6-3-88) would indicate that the 1987 GIBBONS case would not 
be applied retroactively and that the cases of UJARNER v. MORRIS, 709 
P2d 309 (Utah, 1985), BROOKS v. MORRIS, 709 P2d 310 (Utah, 1985), and 
STATE v. MILLER, 718 P2d 403 (Utah, 1986) are applicable to 
Pre-Gibbons situations. 
Even under a Pre-Gibbons analysis of the facts presented in the 
present appeal, the record as a whole does not establish that the 
defendant entered his plea with full knowledge and understanding of 
its consequences, to wit: establishing a factual basis for the pleas 
to the crimes as well as making sure that the Appellant understood 
each and every element of each crime as required by Rule 11(e). See 
also STATE v. BRECKENRIDGE, 688 P2d 440 (Utah, 1983) and STATE v. 
CQPELAND. 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Ut. Sup. Ct., 12-6-88). 
POINT II 
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred by denying 
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his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea- Appellant filed a Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea, pursuant to U . C . A . , section 77-13-6, on July 
28, 1987 (R. 28-31) alleging as his basis violations of the 
BOVKIN/GIBBQNS guidelines. The trial court was thoroughly informed 
by the Appellant of the factual and legal basis for his motion via 
his "Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea" (R. 75-86). However, the trial court denied Appellant's motion. 
As such, Appellant feels that he met his burden of showing good cause 
and the trial court abused its discretion by denying the withdrawal 
motion. In support of this second point on appeal. Appellant 
incorporates herein by reference the factual and legal argument set 
forth above under Point I. 
POINT III 
Appellant asserts that he was denied effective assistance of 
legal counsel during both the plea bargaining stage and plea entry 
stage of the proceedings. 
Basically, Appellant asserts that, upon the advise of his trial 
counsel, he was advised to plead guilty to crimes which he did not 
commit and as such, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The record would bear out this contention due to the fact that 
counsel should have known the requirements of BOYKIN and Rule 11(e) 
and as such, should have made sure that there was a factual basis for 
the Appellant's plea bargain and the subsequent plea. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing argument, Defendant/Appellant requests that 
this Court: 
1. Find that the trial court's acceptance of Appellant's guilty 
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pleas violated the requirements of Rule 11(e) and BOYKIN, and/or tha 
the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing Appellant to 
withdraw his guilty pleas, and/or; that the Appellant was denied 
effective assistance of counsel. 
2. That this court find that reversible error was committed by 
the trial court and that Defendant's guilty pleas be set aside and 
the case remanded; 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
Dated this 6th day of April, 1989. 
Attorney 
ppellant 
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77-35-11. Rule 11 — Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except in case of an infrac-
tion, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, un-
less the defendant waives counsel in open court, and 
shall not be required to plead until he has had a rea-
sonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no 
contest, not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty and 
mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alterna-
tive not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a 
defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corpora-
tion fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the 
consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, 
the case shall forthwith be set for trial. Defendants 
unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In non-felony cases the court shall advise 
the defendant, or his counsel, of the requirements for 
making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty 
or no contest and shall not accept such a plea until 
the court has made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by 
counsel he has knowingly waived his right to 
counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury 
trial and to confront and cross-examine in open 
court the witnesses against him, and that by en-
tering the plea he waives all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the nature 
and elements of the offense to which he is enter-
ing the plea; that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence that may be imposed 
upon him for each offense to which a plea is en-
tered, including the possibility of the imposition 
of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a 
prior plea discussion and plea agreement and if 
so, what agreement has been reached. 
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any 
other party has agreed to request or recommend the 
acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or 
the dismissal of other charges, the same shall be ap-
proved by the court. If recommendations as to sen-
tence are allowed by the court, the court shall advise 
the defendant personally that any recommendation 
as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time 
prior to conviction. A plea of guilty or no contest may 
be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with 
leave of court. i960 
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